How to Kill Home Ownership
Posted: February 11, 2011 Filed under: commercial banking, Economic Develpment, financial institutions, Surreality, Team Obama, We are so F'd | Tags: Bail out of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Timothy Giethner 38 CommentsYour house is about to become even harder to sell, even more unlikely to appreciate, and even more unaffordable to more people. Be prepared to go back to the past. All those young Obama Democrats better love their landlords. They’re likely to be stuck with them for some time. Every think you’d see a headline like this for a Democratic President? Here’s one from NPR Today: Obama Administration: Not Everybody Should Own A Home,
For decades, U.S. housing policy seemed to assume that more home ownership was always better.
At one point in the early ’90s, the government launched the “National Homeownership Strategy,” whose stated goal was to “attempt to help all American households become homeowners.”
So perhaps the most striking thing in today’s housing finance report from the Obama administration is the simple idea that not everybody should own a home (emphasis added):
The Administration believes that we must continue to take the necessary steps to ensure that Americans have access to an adequate range of affordable housing options. This does not mean all Americans should become homeowners. Instead, we should make sure that all Americans who have the credit history, financial capacity, and desire to own a home have the opportunity to take that step. At the same time, we should ensure that there are a range of affordable options for the 100 million Americans who rent, whether they do so by choice or necessity.
This is idea, in turn, leads to the Obama administration’s main conclusion: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should cease to exist.
I’ve been a critic of the way Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were managed for about 15 years. They were packaging up loans and paying bonuses like the worst of the Wall Street set. This had nothing to do with their basic government franchise agreement which is to provide long term funds to back up home loans. The packaging and wheeling and dealing were part and parcel of Fannie and Freddie trying to mimic Wall Street and privatization. However, they both provided products with implied government guarantees. This implies a higher level of due diligence in underwriting and packaging that they basically ignored. It’s similar to USDA grade beef. There was a guarantee that these loans would hold mortgage insurance and be underwritten carefully. The root cause of the problems were not the attempts to get more qualified people into affordable mortgages, it was to feed Wall Street greed and shovel money to their executives who were frequently just political hacks. They simply did the worst of the Wall Street practices at a much higher volume with a more damaging result because of the US stamp of approval; the implicit guarantee.
Now, we have a back to the gilded age future ahead of us. What has made these loans work as loans and the securities that back the loans work is the implied low risk with a decent rate of return. Many, many pension funds and institutional investors hold huge numbers of Fannie and Freddie Securities because they’ve always had high ratings. Most of these pension funds and institutional investors are sources of long term funds. There’s not a lot of a lenders that will lend long these days and that’s going to be a problem for most people looking for a home now more than ever. My guess is that most home loans will now go down to terms of about 15-20 years or they’ll be completely variable rate. That means the homeowner will have to bet on the rate to get an affordable mortgage and gamble their incomes will go up to secure the lowest rates and longest terms. Both of these are highly risky bets. Past data has shown that most people loose with these kinds of mortgages.
Plus, that’s if they can get the funding at all. Without something similar, I doubt that the major sources of these funds which are usually forced into safe investments will be available. Either that, or you’re going to lock in to a fixed rate but for an intermediate term loan. Think about your own house loan and what that would mean for you. You either double your house payment or take the bet that the rate won’t go up enough to force you to default in the future. Most people don’t have sophisticated enough knowledge of economics to even make an educated guess. My guess is that if they take the loan at all, they’ll go for the short term fixed rate loan on a much cheaper house. This is going to change the complexion of the housing market for ever if it goes through as planned.
This is a President used the gipper metaphor for himself. This is the White House that wants less Government in the Mortgage system.
The Obama administration wants to shrink the government’s role in the mortgage system — a proposal that would remake decades of federal policy aimed at getting Americans to buy homes and would probably make home loans more expensive across the board.
The Treasury Department rolled out a plan Friday to slowly dissolve Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored programs that bought up mortgages to encourage more lending and required bailouts during the 2008 financial crisis.
Exactly how far the government’s role in mortgages would be reduced was left to Congress to decide, but all three options the administration presented would create a housing finance system that relies far more on private money.
“It’s clear the administration wants the private sector to take a more prominent role in the mortgage rates, and in order for that to happen, mortgage rates have to go up,” said Thomas Lawler, a housing economist in Virginia.
Abolishing Fannie and Freddie would rewrite 70 years of federal housing policy, from Fannie’s creation as part of the New Deal to President George W. Bush’s drive for an “ownership society” in the 2000s. It would transform how homes are bought and redefine who can afford them.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said the plan would probably not happen for at least five years and would proceed “very carefully.” In the meantime, he said the companies would have the cash they need to meet their existing obligations.
There are other ways to do this. Most would have to do with tighter governance of Fannie and Freddie and elimination of private sector practices of bonuses for volume when government guarantees are involved. Also, a cap for the mortgages to prices more standard through out the country rather than Washington DC would help. Fannie and Freddie should have no place in the jumbo market. Here’s a few of the proposals that are in the White House program.
The Obama administration proposals include raising the rates Fannie and Freddie charge to banks for loan guarantees to the same levels as private banks. Private mortgages for so-called jumbo loans, which are not covered by government guarantees, currently cost between 0.5% and 0.75% more than government-backed mortgages. So, if Fannie and Freddie’s fees were to rise to the market level, mortgage rates across the U.S. might rise substantially.
The administration also proposed lowering the maximum value of a mortgage that can qualify to be federally backed from the current $729,750 to $625,500. That’s a widely suggested move that would attract the private sector to make more loans in the upper range of the market. The proposal also called for Fannie, Freddie and the FHA to set a minimum down payment requirement of 10%. Currently, the agencies are authorized to make loans with no down payments at all.
The big issue is what to do about the government guarantee that assures investors who buy Fannie and Freddie mortgage bonds that the U.S. government will pay back the bonds in the event the underlying mortgages default. Because of that guarantee, Fannie and Freddie can offer lower interest rates than the private sector. Investors, especially foreign investors, were burned by subprime bonds during the financial crisis, and now they won’t touch private mortgage bonds without a government guarantee.
There’s obvious problems with Fannie and Freddie but they mostly lie with how it was managed and how it morphed as more up income and high price assets were put into play. Helping upper income people or expensive real estate markets weren’t originally part of the charter. Making it more like a bank isn’t going to remove the abuses but add to them. Bonuses for production quotas lead to reduced quality.
It would be more prudent to take Fannie and Freddie back to their roots rather than to them strip them of their ability to provide affordable mortgages to entry level home owners. The management got caught up in production over quality of loans because they got bonuses. That was a huge problem. The connection to affordable housing initiatives was never the problem. Churning out crap to feed the investment frenzy of Wall Street and peeling off bonuses for their executives led to their sloppy loan processing. They caught the same disease that plagued the private sector at a larger volume. Congress also did a poor job of oversight.
This move will leave a huge gap in two places. First, it will impact investment portfolios that rely on long term, relatively safe but decent yield-bearing assets. It will also remove one more route to the American dream for ordinary Americans. Let’s just say we’re all taking one for the Gipper.
A Self-Examined Academic Life
Posted: February 6, 2011 Filed under: academia, Equity Markets, financial institutions, Global Financial Crisis | Tags: Fault Lines, Financial Crisis, Matt Yglesias, Raghu Rajan, Tyler Cowen 22 CommentsMacroeconomists seemingly have adopted monastic practices of self-flagellation to explain why the tribe completely
misjudged the housing bubble . Their collective crystal balls didn’t predict an ensuing financial crisis either. A blog entry by Finance Professor Raghu Rajan at University of Chicago has further stimulated the conversation today. He’s written a book called Fault Lines and made remarks from the book at its official blog site. I found it at Memeorandum along with a few choice links.
I’ve written about fresh water and salt water economics before. Some of today’s discussion clearly involves philosophical fault lines. Rajan is from the panultimate fresh water university and all finance academics eventually drown in the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) literature. I’ve been pretty outspoken about how much damage I think the EMH has done to economics and especially my field, financial economics. However, it’s hard to get published in finance journals taking a contrarian view. This is one explanation he examines, then dismisses which is why I’ve taken a good look at his argument.
I have not read his book, but judging from the video and this blog entry, Rajan spends some time on the role of EMH and EMH true believers in the crisis. I can provide you with my own anecdotes on this. I can also tell you I tried to avoid some seminars because I don’t want to read any more Eugene Fama who is Rajan’s colleague. I frankly think EMH blinders or misunderstanding were a good deal–but not all–of the problem.
I was researching the subprime markets directly after Katrina and was told by my finance professors that I was following an unpublishable and boring line of research. (They used the term ‘unsexy’.) I saw hints of problems in subprime markets as early as late 2005 in the work I did with the sensitivity of stock prices of finance companies heavily invested in subprime loans to some key macroeconomic variables. I was told that line of research was unlikely to help my marketability and ability to get tenure upon graduation. They yawned when I presented the paper. I turned it in for my third econometrics seminar and switched to something else.
Finance journals editors do love them some EMH so anything on market anomalies is likely to get a jaundiced set of editor eyes. But, Rajan brings up some important points and the resulting discussion is worth viewing here. Here’s Rajan talking directly to the EMH and why he thinks it may not be a big deal.
Perhaps the reason was ideology: we were too wedded to the idea that markets are efficient, market participants are rational, and high prices are justified by economic fundamentals. But some of this criticism of “market fundamentalism” reflects a misunderstanding. The dominant “efficient markets theory” says only that markets reflect what is publicly known, and that it is hard to make money off markets consistently – something verified by the hit that most investor portfolios took in the crisis. The theory does not say that markets cannot plummet if the news is bad, or if investors become risk-averse.
Critics argue that the fundamentals were deteriorating in plain sight, and that the market (and economists) simply ignored it. But hindsight distorts analysis. We cannot point to a lonely Cassandra like Robert Shiller of Yale University, who regularly argued that house prices were unsustainable, as proof that the truth was ignored. There are always naysayers, and they are often wrong. There were many more economists who believed that house prices, though high, were unlikely to fall across the board.
Rajan points out that this probably isn’t the sole or primary explanation even though it is one that gets a lot of ink these days. I too think some of the problem is a misunderstanding of the various forms of EMH . So, the major philosophical debate happening in finance circles isn’t central to Rajan’s explanation. There is no conspiracy of EMH apologists to force misunderstanding of market rationality, so alright, I’ll give him that one.
Economist Tyler Cowen at Marginal Revolution likes the alternative succinct explanation Rajan provides. (You should read the comments to that thread.)
Raghu Rajan nails it:
I would argue that three factors largely explain our collective failure: specialization, the difficulty of forecasting, and the disengagement of much of the profession from the real world.
Rajan also dismisses another circle of conspirators by stating this. It’s also probably why one of those so-called progressives jumped on the dismissal earlier today. This conspiracy meme crosses circles of folks that are more into political economy than economics itself. This group argues the hypothesis that the “system” bribed economists to stay quiet. I’ve gotten into it more than a few people of the Matt Stoller mindset and various Rand hanger-ons about this improbable case. One of the biggest memes is that the FED actively influences economists not to publish things against their interests. (Usually, this comes from Austrian School folks who can’t get published any where mainstream because they want to completely operate outside of the scientific method and ignore data.) Matt Yglesias is one of these people making a living off this canard and he jumped to the bait immediately. His reasoning speaks more about him than about economists.
Gotta Love those Wikileaks
Posted: January 17, 2011 Filed under: commercial banking, Corporate Crime, Diplomacy Nightmares, financial institutions, Foreign Affairs, investment banking, Tunisia, Wikileaks | Tags: corruption, jasmine revolution, Julian Assange, offshore banking, Rudolf Elmer, Swiss banks, Tunisia, whistle blowers, Wikileaks 14 CommentsI’m still waiting for the BOA Wikileaks data drop but the idea of a Swiss Banker from offshore banking haven, The Cayman
Islands, dropping a dime on a few of those tax evading customers is almost as sweet. I can sense the thickness of air hanging in private clubs all over the world from my little corner of the ninth ward.
Rudolf M. Elmer, the former head of the Cayman Islands office of the prominent Swiss bank Julius Baer, refused to identify any of the individuals or companies, but told reporters at a press conference that about 40 politicians and “pillars of society” worldwide are among them.
He told The Observer newspaper over the weekend that those named in the documents come from “the U.S., Britain, Germany, Austria and Asia — from all over,” and include “business people, politicians, people who have made their living in the arts and multinational conglomerates — from both sides of the Atlantic.”
Mr. Assange said that WikiLeaks would verify and release the information, including the names, in as little as two weeks. He suggested possible partnerships with financial news organizations and said he would consider turning the information over to Britain’s Serious Fraud Office, a government agency that investigates financial corruption.
That’s a wow story! But then, there’s been a series of them coming from Assange’s organization and the entire thing is just too great for words. Any one that really doesn’t see that Wikileaks is becoming THE way for little guys to undermine the power elites of the world is basically a tool of oppressors and autocrats. Just as Bradley Manning witnessed tapes that revealed the incredibly war crimes and inhumanity of a few American soldiers, Rudolf Elmer has witnessed pilfering that probably includes profiteering from crimes against humanity. However, like every one else, I want NAMES.
Check out the CIA’s list of the RICHEST countries in the world in per capita terms. I always love to quiz my students on which ones shake out at the top and they nearly always get it wrong. The top ten countries–with the exceptions of oil rich Kuwait and Norway–are all havens of offshore banking, tax evasion, and gambling. The USA has dropped to number 11 on the richest country list. Undoubtedly, it still holds that position because of its Investment Bankers. As I mentioned in the Friday Reads, it’s not because we reward our brain surgeons, 4 star generals, or great minds. I’m appalled that this might be the century that proves Karl Marx right on how ‘capitalism’ eventually falls. I’m only afraid that it will not be replaced with any kind of utopia; worker or otherwise.
What was Rudolf Elmer’s motivation?
Mr. Elmer said he had turned to WikiLeaks to educate society about what he considers an unfair system designed to serve the rich and aid money launderers after his offers to provide the data to universities and governments were spurned and, in his opinion, the Swiss media failed to cover the substance of his allegations. “The man in the street needs to know how this system works,” he said, referring to the offshore trusts that many “high net worth individuals” across the world use to evade taxes.
This, is the beauty of the Wikileaks. (I’m going to take some time here to wave to our junior G-guys and G-gals!) It gives a voice to those of us that work in the trenches holding up a system that rewards our work with pink slips, loss of insurance, and raises that don’t keep up with the cost of living don’t have much power. The information we sit on frequently has a lot of power. Once released to the public domain, it has even more power. These leaks expose corruption and thievery; pure and simple.








Recent Comments