Zombie Regulation
Posted: September 10, 2009 Filed under: Bailout Blues, Equity Markets, Global Financial Crisis, U.S. Economy | Tags: bank regulation, banker pay, Goldman Sachs Comments Off on Zombie Regulation
Public Policy chaos is hard to miss these days. One moment it’s which health plan will make its way through the blue dogs in the Senate and the liberals in the house. The next moment it’s escalation of military actions in Afghanistan; probably where the original quagmire reference was developed at the dawn of time. Look this way!!! No look that way!!! Then there’s the forgotten war against financial risk excess. I could create a pretty good argument that much of the chaos might be to distract us from the rumblings still coming from the Wall Street fault line. Good thing the Europeans are looking, because it seems that we’re certainly not. That means they’ll be at least one safe place to put your money, eventually. Unfortunately, it won’t be here.
The Chief Executive of the Vampire squid was in Germany this week telling the Europeans exactly what they wanted to hear (h/t to myiq2xu). This should’ve elicited the “D’oh” heard round the world. Problem is, no one in the U.S. is listening. We have yet to see any serious proposal to regulate and standardize the types of complex financial derivatives that nearly brought the world economy to it’s knees less than a year ago.
Lloyd Blankfein, chief executive of Goldman Sachs, on Wednesday admitted that banks lost control of the exotic products they sold in the run-up to the financial crisis, and said that some of the instruments lacked social or economic value.
In a speech to the Handelsblatt banking conference in Frankfurt, he also repeated an attack, first made in the spring, on Wall Street compensation practices, calling the furore over bankers’ pay “understandable and appropriate”.
The startling message from the head of the world’s most high-profile investment bank echoes comments by Lord Turner, chairman of the Financial Services Authority, the UK regulator, who provoked controversy last month when he questioned the social value of much investment banking activity.
Mr Blankfein said: “The industry let the growth and complexity in new instruments outstrip their economic and social utility as well as the operational capacity to manage them.”
This is so true. When it takes an army of lawyers to work on one tranche and the contracts it involves, when it takes
math that requires physicists turned financiers to price the silly things, and when the resolution process is so whacked that it can take months to figure out who owns what, you’ve got control problems. Even more true is the fact that investments in these products doesn’t really create anything of value. It ties capital up in arbitrage and speculation rather than placing it the hands of entrepreneurs that actually create products and services. Top it off with cash out flows via bonuses from stock holders to what amounts to a professional gambling class and you’re bound to create a major clusterfuck eventually. So, given the clusterfuck last year, why aren’t we rewriting financial law?
The Blame Game
Posted: September 7, 2009 Filed under: Bailout Blues, Equity Markets, Global Financial Crisis, The Bonus Class, The DNC, The Great Recession, The Media SUCKS, U.S. Economy, Voter Ignorance | Tags: Congressman Alan Grayson, Fannie Mae, Franklin Reins, Freddie Mac Comments Off on The Blame Game
It’s amazing to me that so many people can get so worked up about one mid level bureaucrat in the White House who is a repentant communist and says he accidentally signed a 9-11 truther petition thinking it was just a request for more information on what the White House knew prior to those terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, we have a Secretary Treasury whose taken gifts from banks, underpaid his taxes by more money than I personally see in years, and seems completely captured by Wall Street and unable to draft decent regulation containing their gambling addiction. Then, there is the fact that I continually write about the same people in Wall Street and the Investment Banking community cooking up death derivatives and going about their merry way, subsidized, unpunished, and totally unrepentant over causing the worst financial crisis since 1929.
I just have to scream: WTF is wrong with you people? Why are we punishing some one for his venture into social activism while completely ignoring people that are making off with our national treasure and the lifeblood of our mixed market economy? These are folks that drove your house prices down, ruined your pension plans and your 401k, and are taking bailouts by the billions. Where’s the sense of balance? How does this resemble justice?
Here’s a REALLY good example from today’s NY Times. Written by Gretchen Morgensen, it’s called “Fair Game-They Left Fannie Mae, but we got the Legal Bills.” It’s all about the government having to bail out Fannie Mae because of the extremely bad management practices, and yes, illegal accounting practices that stuck us with a huge mess and an even bigger bill. Morgensen interviews Representative Alan Grayson, a Florida Democrat, who is one congress critter doing his oversight responsibility while others wallow in the political contributions from their regulatees.
With all the turmoil of the financial crisis, you may have forgotten about the book-cooking that went on at Fannie Mae. Government inquiries found that between 1998 and 2004, senior executives at Fannie manipulated its results to hit earnings targets and generate $115 million in bonus compensation. Fannie had to restate its financial results by $6.3 billion.
Almost two years later, in 2006, Fannie’s regulator concluded an investigation of the accounting with a scathing report. “The conduct of Mr. Raines, chief financial officer J. Timothy Howard, and other members of the inner circle of senior executives at Fannie Mae was inconsistent with the values of responsibility, accountability, and integrity,” it said.
That year, the government sued Mr. Raines, Mr. Howard and Leanne Spencer, Fannie’s former controller, seeking $100 million in fines and $115 million in restitution from bonuses the government contended were not earned. Without admitting wrongdoing, Mr. Raines, Mr. Howard and Ms. Spencer paid $31.4 million in 2008 to settle the litigation.
When these top executives left Fannie, the company was obligated to cover the legal costs associated with shareholder suits brought against them in the wake of the accounting scandal.
Now those costs are ours. Between Sept. 6, 2008, and July 21, we taxpayers spent $2.43 million to defend Mr. Raines, $1.35 million for Mr. Howard, and $2.52 million to defend Ms. Spencer.
“I cannot see the justification of people who led these organizations into insolvency getting a free ride,” Mr. Grayson said. “It goes right to the heart of what people find most disturbing in this situation — the absolute lack of justice.”
What’s the difference between getting justice and getting retribution? Well, in terms of missing it by light years, compare the treatment between social activist Van Jones and practitioners of accounting malpractice like Raines, Howard and Spencer (or tax dodgers who get gifts from Wall Street Bankers like our SOT). It’s the difference between a slap on the wrist and a slap across the face.
And Next Up, A Good Game of RISK
Posted: September 6, 2009 Filed under: Bailout Blues, Equity Markets, Global Financial Crisis, Surreality, The Bonus Class | Tags: death derivatives, life insurance policies, securitization Comments Off on And Next Up, A Good Game of RISK
If you still need motivation to get on my bandwagon for new bank regulation, go read “Back to Business: Wall Street Pursues Profit in Bundles of Life Insurance.” While the nation is having a good scream over communists in the White House and Bolshevik health care reform, the bankers are playing Risk with your tax dollars.
After the mortgage business imploded last year, Wall Street investment banks began searching for another big idea to make money. They think they may have found one.The bankers plan to buy “life settlements,” policies for life insurance for elderly parents which allow the ill and elderly people sell for cash — $400,000 for a $1 million policy, say, depending on the life expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to “securitize” these policies, in Wall Street jargon, by packaging hundreds or thousands together into bonds. They will then resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will receive the payouts when people with the insurance die.
The earlier the policyholder dies, the bigger the return — though if people live longer than expected, investors could get poor returns or even lose money.
Either way, Wall Street would profit by pocketing sizable fees for creating the bonds, reselling them and subsequently trading them. But some who have studied life settlements warn that insurers might have to raise premiums in the short term if they end up having to pay out more death claims than they had anticipated.
The idea is still in the planning stages. But already “our phones have been ringing off the hook with inquiries,” says Kathleen Tillwitz, a senior vice president at DBRS, which gives risk ratings to investments and is reviewing nine proposals for life-insurance securitizations from private investors and financial firms, including Credit Suisse.
“We’re hoping to get a herd stampeding after the first offering,” said one investment banker not authorized to speak to the news media.
Oh, that’s just great! The same folks left unregulated and un-rebuked from the mortgage meltdown (and rewarded with subsidies) get to misprice yet another set of iffy securities. If this isn’t a more “exotic” investment than credit default swaps and harder to price, I’ll turn in all my Phd class credits (including the one specifically geared to Risk Theory) for an electrician’s license. Investment bankers seem to be on hyperdrive to find the next big thing before congress even realizes the horses are back out of the barn again.
It’s just a Ball of Infusion
Posted: September 5, 2009 Filed under: Bailout Blues, Equity Markets, Global Financial Crisis, U.S. Economy | Tags: bank profitability, credit card lending, discount window, mortgage deliquencies, prime mortgages, Subprime mortgages Comments Off on It’s just a Ball of Infusion
I’m having a difficult time reconciling the new found bank profitability driving more executive bonuses to this article at the WSJ. It’s called “Troubles for ‘Prime Borrowers Intensify” and it has some startling data. First there’s these numbers on prime mortgages which are undoubtedly creating some of the problems at the FHA that’s fueling rumors of the need for yet another bailout.
The mortgage-delinquency rate among so-called subprime borrowers reached 25% in the first quarter but appears to be leveling off, rising only slightly in the second quarter. The pace of delinquencies for prime borrowers is accelerating. Since prime loans account for 80% of U.S. bank exposure to mortgages and credit cards, these losses could ultimately exceed those from weaker borrowers.
Losses are also mounting in that group for credit card debt. This is because of the increased duration of unemployment for many folks. They basically are tapped out and don’t even have their home equity as a source of potential liquidity. Since unemployment, and especially duration is not really on the mend, how long can this go on before bank capital takes a hit again?
In addition to cutting back on spending, strapped prime borrowers often can keep up with their bills longer than subprime borrowers by draining savings accounts, reducing contributions to retirement plans and turning to family members for money. They also are typically slower than subprime customers to seek help for financial problems because they are concerned about the stigma associated with such assistance, credit counselors say.
About 40% of the strapped consumers seeking help from the OnTrack Financial Education & Counseling center in Asheville, N.C., are prime borrowers, up from 15% last year, says Tom Luzon, director of counseling services at the United Way agency. Many of these clients already scaled back their lifestyles after losing their jobs or seeing their salaries slashed. Some are small-business owners whose companies foundered as a result of the recession.
“They have made adjustments and made adjustments, but then you get to a point where you can’t adjust anymore,” says Mr. Luzon, who is a former banker.
“People who are middle-class wage earners initially may have severance pay and think they have plenty of time to find a job, but then they start using credit cards to support living expenses,” he says.
So, my question is this. If some of the original bank profitability recently has been due the availability of cheap funds through the FED, TARP, and other government sources, if prime borrowers are now having increased difficulty paying their obligations, what happens to bank profitability if the government funds dry up? How long do we have to keep propping the banks up while they merrily repeat the same portfolio decisions that can’t work once the market rates are back at market levels? Also, how are they going to absorb these increasing level of loan losses?
I frankly can’t see the end to banks requiring cheap sources of funds like the Fed window. I can’t believe the economy is going to recover fast enough for this to change. How long will we have to infuse the banks with tax payer dollars and on-the-cheap loans through the discount window? I don’t think most of these institutions could function without it.
And now, a Game of Concentration
Posted: August 31, 2009 Filed under: Bailout Blues, Equity Markets, Global Financial Crisis, U.S. Economy | Tags: banking cartel, banking oligopoly, TARP Comments Off on And now, a Game of ConcentrationWhen I saw this NYT Headline, “As Big Banks Repay Bailout Money, U.S. Sees a Profit”, it really did not send me to a

Expecting customer service? Fat Chance!
happy place. You’re probably going to raise a Spock-like eyebrow and ask me to explain. Why, Kat, you’re probably saying, isn’t a 15% return on our “money” a good deal in this market? Remember finance 101, rates are relative to risk so let me tell you why I’m a concern troll on this. First, here’s what the author thought was the punch line to this story.
But critics at the time warned that taxpayers might not see any profits, and that it could take years for the banks to repay the loans.
As Congress debated the bailout bill last September that would authorize the Treasury Department to spend up to $700 billion to stem the financial crisis, Representative Mac Thornberry, Republican of Texas, said: “Seven hundred billion dollars of taxpayer money should not be used as a hopeful experiment.”
So far, that experiment is more than paying off. The government has taken profits of about $1.4 billion on its investment in Goldman Sachs, $1.3 billion on Morgan Stanley and $414 million on American Express. The five other banks that repaid the government — Northern Trust, Bank of New York Mellon, State Street, U.S. Bancorp and BB&T — each brought in $100 million to $334 million in profit.
What the author really missed was that information also comes on the back of this information last week that shows that the government has created incredible high concentration ratios in the banking market. I discussed it here in a piece where I called it a big ol’ game of monopoly. This is an ongoing policy disaster and many folks appear to be missing it.
J.P. Morgan Chase, an amalgam of some of Wall Street’s most storied institutions, now holds more than $1 of every $10 on deposit in this country. So does Bank of America, scarred by its acquisition of Merrill Lynch and partly government-owned as a result of the crisis, as does Wells Fargo, the biggest West Coast bank. Those three banks, plus government-rescued and -owned Citigroup, now issue one of every two mortgages and about two of every three credit cards, federal data show.
There are so many headlines buried in that NYT piece that you’d think it was written by ostriches. This is one alone should’ve grabbed a banner headline.
But the real profit came as banks were permitted to buy back the so-called warrants, whose low fixed price provided a windfall for the government as the shares of the companies soared.
Well, isn’t that nice, the best borrowers paid back first. Some one over there ever take any finance classes? I doubt it. Of course, that’s going to happen you twit!! It’s the implication of what that means that scares the pants off me. The fact they’ve borrowed funds allows us to regulate their actions. Now, the big ones are paying them back so they’re out of the reach of tighter TARP regulation! They like their old loosey goosey nonsense regulations especially now that they’re all set up as a de facto cartel with government blessing. They’re ready to price discriminate, restrict services, and create extraordinary profits all they want with FEW RESTRICTIONS. Just wait until we get to witness the new and improved, unregulated CEO pay schemes!
It’s similar to handing all of our energy needs and policy over to OPEC.





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