All Eyes on Ben
Posted: July 27, 2009 Filed under: Bailout Blues, Global Financial Crisis, The Great Recession, U.S. Economy | Tags: Ben Bernanke, Dennis Kucinich, Federal Reserve Bank, Nouriel Roubini, PBS News Hour, Regulating the FED, Ron Paul, ZIRP Comments Off on All Eyes on Ben
I’ve been Fed watching again. That’s something of both an occupational hazard and a weirdish hobby for me. Usually, Fed chairs stay off the lecture circuit until they retire and write their biographies. Ben Bernanke, however, is not your usual Fed Chair and these are not usual times. I think you may recall that part of his observations with being in charge of monetary policy when there’s no room drop interest rates (ZIRP) has to do with communicating future Fed actions to a nervous public. This continues.
Bernanke was in Kansas City over the weekend speaking to normal people and Jim Lehr of the PBS program News Hour. There were several things from this exchange worth mentioning. The first is a response to the meme circulating around the libertarian circuit that there is no accountability between the FED and any one in Washington. That is untrue for several reasons. First, because the majority of appointments (including the Fed Chair) to the FOMC are made by POTUS and approved by the Senate. Second, the Fed Chair makes biannual trips to the Hill to speak with both houses of Congress and take questions. Third, they publish their internal records as well as their research continually. It’s a matter of public record. The only thing Congress doesn’t get to see is the rationale behind monetary policy which is perfectly in keeping with the idea of independence supported overwhelmingly by evidence and theory. They have to the right to see the Fed balance sheet and items now. What they do not have is the right to ‘audit’ monetary policy. Something that would be a disaster.
“The Federal Reserve, in collaboration with the giant banks, has created the greatest financial crisis the world has ever seen,” Representative Ron Paul, Republican of Texas, said at a House hearing last week in which Mr. Bernanke testified about the state of the economy.
Republican lawmakers portray the Fed as the embodiment of heavy-handed big government, and have called for scaling back the central bank’s regulatory powers. But liberal Democrats, like Representative Dennis J. Kucinich of Ohio, have accused the Federal Reserve of caving in to demands by banks for huge bailouts, for failing to protect consumers against dangerous financial products and for being too secretive about its emergency rescue programs.
More than 250 lawmakers have signed a bill sponsored by Mr. Paul that would allow the Government Accountability Office to “audit” the Fed’s decisions on monetary policy — a move that Fed officials see as a direct threat to their political independence in carrying out their central mission of setting interest rates.
A lot of the complaints at the appearance came from the audience who basically aired Kucinich’s view that the Fed appeared all too willing to bail out the reckless big guys while letting the little guys go belly under. Bernanke did not shy away from the questions at all.
When a small-business owner asked Mr. Bernanke why the Fed helped rescue big banks while “short-changing” small companies, Mr. Bernanke answered that he had decided to “hold my nose” because he was afraid the entire financial system would collapse.
“I’m as disgusted by it as you are,” he told the audience of 190 people. “Nothing made me more angry than having to intervene, particularly in a few cases where companies took wild bets.”
He used a most interesting metaphor when explaining why he had to hold his nose and bail out the gamblers. He basically said, if an elephant falls it crushes the grass beneath it. Wow, a zen moment from a Fed Chair. Who’d have thought that was possible? He also said that the main reason he did it was because he didn’t not want to be the Fed Chair at the time of the second Great Depression. I’d say that was succinct enough.
The Realities of Market Failure
Posted: July 26, 2009 Filed under: Health care reform | Tags: CBO, health insurance, HMOs, Kenneth Arrow, Paul Krugman, Peter Orzag, welfare economics Comments Off on The Realities of Market Failure
Paul Krugman jumped further in to the health care reform debate today just as the CBO announced that the Obama Plan, billed as a cost-saver, continues to be anything but cost saving. Krugman rightly points out that in a land of third party payers, you are not going to find a free market solution. This is simply true by definition so why is there so much confusion?
Krugman borrows heavily from an earlier treatise by Kenneth Arrow, one of the early pioneers of modern economics in a 1963 treatise called Uncertainty and the Welfare economics of health Care. (Note: The link on Krugman’s blog is bad so use mine.) Let me just mention here that Welfare in economics means you’re looking for allocative efficiency within an economy given that economy’s income distribution. Since so few folks in this country have the majority of income and resources, for example, the U.S. is a considered about average on allocative efficiency. Our resources are not distributed based on the aggregate welfare of society. We have a system where there are winners and losers because most of our goods are distributed by ability to pay and most of that ability to pay comes from accident of birth.
So, Krugman updates the Arrow treatise and argues that healthcare is not what you would refer to as a standard market that would thrive under free market conditions. He points to two very distinct characteristics that takes it out of contention for a completely free market solution which borrow heavily from Arrow.
There are two strongly distinctive aspects of health care. One is that you don’t know when or whether you’ll need care — but if you do, the care can be extremely expensive. The big bucks are in triple coronary bypass surgery, not routine visits to the doctor’s office; and very, very few people can afford to pay major medical costs out of pocket.
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The second thing about health care is that it’s complicated, and you can’t rely on experience or comparison shopping. (”I hear they’ve got a real deal on stents over at St. Mary’s!”) That’s why doctors are supposed to follow an ethical code, why we expect more from them than from bakers or grocery store owners.
If you’ve followed any of my blogging carefully, you will recognize two underlying themes that we’ve frequently talked about throughout Krugman’s assessment. That would be that the health care market has the two nasty frictions of moral hazard and information asymmetry. Insurance companies, theoretically, should provide cost effective remedies to both. However, there are things unique to health insurance and the underlying risk of getting catastrophic illnesses that make huge risk pools the most cost effective. This is the primary economic argument for universal healthcare. Putting every one (the healthy and the unhealthy) into one HUGE risk pool, minimizes the cost to everyone, thereby maximizing allocative efficiency and economic welfare. Insurance companies that cherry pick, and healthy folks that self opt-out of risk pools, violate these principles and make it more expensive and less efficient for every one.
What Exactly are they fighting to Preserve?
Posted: July 25, 2009 Filed under: Health care reform | Tags: Democrats, Waxman, Waxman-Markey, World's Worst Health Care Reforms Comments Off on What Exactly are they fighting to Preserve?Here’s an interesting link from Foreign Policy. We’ve joined China, Russia, and wait for it, wait for it … that bastion of global civilization …Turkmenistan on the list of the World’s Worst Health Care Reforms.
I understand why Republicans are fighting progress on Health Care Reform because they don’t like progress of any sort, but what about those democrats who want to reinvigorate health insurance industry profits? What exactly are they supporting? Continuation of failure?
System: Employer-based private coverage, with an under-regulated private insurance market, and
government-subsidized public plans for the poor, elderly, and disabled
Reform: The United States has the rare distinction of being both one of the world’s richest countries and having one of its least-functional health care systems.
Americans spend around one in every six dollars on healthcare. But, in aggregate, they’re not getting much bang for their buck. People in the United States are as likely to die from diseases like lung cancer as citizens in all OECD countries – which, on average, spend less than half as much per capita. Some 47 million lack any health insurance coverage. An estimated 600,000 people file for bankruptcy every year because they cannot pay their medical expenses. Indeed, the United States is the only rich country without universal coverage.
The U.S. government has repeatedly tried to create a more coherent plan and to make sure more Americans are insured. Reformers have scored piecemeal victories — such as the 1997 creation of the State Children’s Health Insurance Plan, or Massachusetts’ recent implementation of universal coverage.
But for the most part, the history of health reform in the United States has been a history of failure. The last attempt at comprehensive reform — the 1993 bill derided as “HillaryCare,” during the administration of Bill Clinton — floundered in Congress. Since then, costs and premiums have doubled, a lower percentage of employers offer coverage, and millions more are uninsured.
Subprime Mortgage Myths
Posted: July 24, 2009 Filed under: Global Financial Crisis, U.S. Economy | Tags: home values, lending, mortgage meltdown, mortgage originations, securitization, Subprime mortgages Comments Off on Subprime Mortgage MythsYuliya Demyanyk, a senior research economist at the Cleveland Fed, has done a fascinating job debunking some of the bigger memes floating around main stream media outlets about the Subprime Mortgage Market. Her Economic Commentary piece here distills the more germane information found in the research published here. Her bottom line is that it was not so much the meltdown of the subprime market with its components of interest rate resets, declining underwriting standards, and declining home values that contributed to the systemic problems creating the big financial meltdown. She argues that it was the interplay between that market and the securitization process, lending and housing booms, and leveraging
One of the biggest myths surrounding the subprime market is that subprime mortgages are given solely to borrowers with impaired
credit. Demyank and her fellow reseacher Van Hemmert found that many folks actually wound up in certain subprime loans not because of their credit history (which was not impaired) but the fact that certain loans were only available in the subprime market because that was the type of loan demanded by the securitization market.
But mortgages could also be labeled subprime if they were originated by a lender specializing in high-cost loans—although not all high-cost loans are subprime. Also, unusual types of mortgages generally not available in the prime market, such as “2/28 hybrids,” which switch to an adjustable interest rate after only two years of a fixed rate, would be labeled subprime even if they were given to borrowers with credit scores that were sufficiently high to qualify for prime mortgage loans. This is very good for a credit repair company with money-back guarantee because they get clients that are above prime for subprime rates.
The process of securitizing a loan could also affect its subprime designation. Many subprime mortgages were securitized and sold on the secondary market. Securitizers rank ordered pools of mortgages from the most to the least risky at the time of securitization, basing the ranking on a combination of several risk factors, such as credit score, loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, etc. The most risky pools would become a part of a subprime security. All the loans in that security would be labeled subprime, regardless of the borrowers’ credit score.
Mortgage originators may have directed some folks to these loans based on the characteristics of the loan, not necessarily the characteristics of the buyer.
A second myth debunked by the research is the idea that subprime mortgages were used to promote home ownership. By slicing and dicing the lending data base, the two researchers found some interesting numbers as they relate to overall homeownership statistics.
The availability of subprime mortgages in the United States did not facilitate increased homeownership. Between 2000 and 2006, approximately one million borrowers took subprime mortgages to finance the purchase of their first home. These subprime loans did contribute to an increased level of homeownership in the country—at the time of mortgage origination. Unfortunately, many homebuyers with subprime loans defaulted within a couple of years of origination. The number of such defaults outweighs the number of first-time homebuyers with subprime mortgages.
Given that there were more defaults among all (not just first-time) homebuyers with subprime loans than there were first-time homebuyers with subprime loans, it is impossible to conclude that subprime mortgages promoted homeownership.
Keyboard Cat plays off Okun’s Law
Posted: July 23, 2009 Filed under: Team Obama, The Great Recession, U.S. Economy | Tags: GDP growth, Okun's law, unemployment Comments Off on Keyboard Cat plays off Okun’s Law
I’ve been teaching Okun’s Law in my principles level Macroeconomics courses since 1980. It’s been the policy rule of thumb since the Kennedy years on how much GDP needs to change to get a movement in the unemployment rate. Here’s the Wiki explanation which is as good as any.
In economics, Okun’s law is an empirically observed relationship relating unemployment to losses in a country’s production. The “gap version” states that for every 1% increase in the unemployment rate, a country’s GDP will be an additional roughly 2% lower than its potential GDP. The “difference version” describes the relationship between quarterly changes in unemployment and quarterly changes in real GDP. The accuracy of the law has been disputed. The name refers economist Arthur Okun who proposed the relationship in 1962 (Prachowny 1993).
I’ve mentioned recently that we’re seeing some fundamental changes in that relationship. This WSJ article talks more about how we’re breaking away from the historical pattern studied by Okun back in the 1960s. This has incredible ramifications for fiscal policy makers. Again, I think the Obama economic advisers appear to be ignoring some really important changes in the fundamentals. We’re much more oriented towards imports, service jobs, and capital than we were back in the Camelot days.





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